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I. INTRODUCTION
The last two decades have seen a rise in the use of technology to facilitate
everything from maintaining personal finances, conducting everyday business,
staying in touch with one's colleagues and family members, and more. In order
to keep track of the myriad people who use these various online processes and
platforms, companies have also resorted to more technologically-advanced
263
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methods of collecting and storing user information. Namely, data collected from
people signing up for email services, Facebook accounts, online banking
profiles, retail rewards programs, and even employment records is all stored in
"the cloud," an abstract vault under theoretical lock-and-key.
1 Just like any
tangible system, the security measures in place for any one company's data
storage system can be breached, exposing millions of peoples' data to
cybercriminals who can manipulate and misuse this information.
2
While many breaches never result in the public release of data,
3 and
some go entirely undetected, remarkably few people ever actually know when
their data has been breached-even after the affected service has publicly
acknowledged an incident.4 Data breaches are ever more present as the
information economy places more value on data linked to individual users.
5 But
plaintiffs have yet to find redress across federal courts, even when breached
information could result in future identify theft.
I Quentin Hardy, Where Does Cloud Storage Really Reside? And Is It Secure?, N.Y. TIMES:
ASK THE TIMES (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/23/insider/where-does-cloud-
storage-really-reside-and-is-it-secure.html.
2 Jeff Elder, A "Staggering" Failure to Adopt Basic Security Habits Led to 70% of Companies
Storing Data with Amazon, Microsoft, or Other Big Cloud Vendors Getting Hacked or Exposing
Data Last Year, Researchers Say, BUs. INSIDER (July 8, 2020, 5:36 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/cloud-computing-hacked-cybersecurity-sophos-amazon-2020-
7.
3 See, e.g., Brendan I. Koerner, Inside the Cyberattack that Shocked the US Government,
WIRED (Oct. 23, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/inside-cyberattack-shocked-us-
government/; see also Lily Hay Newman, The Wired Guide to Data Breaches, WIRED (Dec. 7,
2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-to-data-breaches/?GuidesLeamMore
("Pilfered OPM data never circulated online or showed up on the black market, likely because it
was stolen for its intelligence value rather than its street value. Reports indicated that Chinese
operatives may have used the information to supplement a database cataloging US citizens and
government activity.").
4 In fact, this Author had never previously been notified of her information being exposed
through a data breach until she investigated this herself using one of several legitimate websites.
After inputting her email address into the website Have IBeen Pwned, this Author discovered that
personal information linked to this email address had been exposed in ten separate breaches over
the course of a decade. This Author's personal story is not uncommon in America today. See also
HAVE I BEEN PWNED?, https://haveibeenpwned.com (last visited Sept. 6, 2020). To check the
security of an email address, readers can input their personal email into the search bar on this secure
website's Home page and click the "pwned?" button. The website will then break down and explain
any known data breaches that the email address has been involved in, including the type of breach.
It is generally recommended that users subsequently change all passwords associated with an email
address involved in a known breach. See also Lily Hay Newman, All the Ways Equifax Epically
Bungled Its Breach Response, WIRED (Sept. 24, 2017, 9:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-breach-response/.
5 Meera Jagannathan, Data Breached Soared by 17% in 2019: "We Also Saw the Rise of a
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This raises an important question: Is the risk of future identity theft (or
other harm) enough to establish standing for plaintiffs to sue in federal court after
a data breach? Most recently, there has been a split among United States circuit
courts of appeals regarding this question. In In re United States Office of
Personnel Management Data Security Breach Litigation (In re U.S. OPM), 6 the
D.C. Circuit held that it was, siding with the Sixth,7 Seventh,8 and Ninth 9 Circuits
in finding that plaintiffs alleging a risk of future harm can establish standing.'0
However, in Beck v. McDonald," the Fourth Circuit recently held the opposite,
joining the ranks of the Second,12 Third,1 3 and Eighth' 4 Circuits in requiring
plaintiffs to show more before standing is established.15 Our increasingly
technology-driven world has made data much more valuable, and even with
strides being made in cybersecurity, data is now also more vulnerable to misuse
when breaches occur.' 6 However, the imminence of the threat of data misuse in
the wake of a breach should not be held to the same stringent constitutional
standard as other issues of imminence given that data can be accessed and stored
for months or even years before it is used or "stolen." Rather, courts should
weigh the devastating effects of identity theft in the 21st century more heavily
against the imminent threat requirement to better protect plaintiffs seeking justice
in the wake of a data breach.
Yet individual state data protection laws vary, leading to inconsistencies
and a lack of uniformity regarding data breach victims' rights. Luckily, the
United States has new guidance available. The European Union ("EU") recently
adopted the General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR" or "the Regulation"),
a sweeping regulatory framework which aims to protect all EU citizens from data
and privacy breaches and imposes strict standards on all companies that process
EU citizens' data, regardless of the company's location.
6 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019) [hereinafter In re US. OPMj.
7 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2016).
8 See Lewert v. P.F. Chang's China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016); Remijas v.
Neiman Marcus Grp., L.L.C., 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015); Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499
F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
9 See Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).
10 In re US. OPM, 928 F.3d at 75.
" 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017).
2 Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 Fed. App'x 89 (2d Cir. 2017).
'3 Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
14 See In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017).
15 Beck, 848 F.3d at 272.
16 See Michael Grothaus, How Our Data Got Hacked, Scandalized, and Abused in 2018, FAST
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This Note will identify the implication of the current standing doctrine
on plaintiffs' rights in data breach cases and how the European Union's GDPR
can provide principles and guidance to adapt the American standing framework
to the modern era. After identifying the ways in which the GDPR affords citizens
more rights for redress post-breach, this Note will posit that the U.S. should adopt
a framework to update constitutional standards and show why such a standard
will work for the American legal system. Accordingly, this Note aims to provide
the Supreme Court and Congress with a new method of analysis for framing the
need for uniform standing rules across the United States, specifically in relation
to data breach litigation. By adopting a uniform rule, the U.S. can create a system
that is beneficial to both sides. Not only would companies be deterred from
engaging in behavior that might lead to breaches in the future, but, also, the
affected plaintiffs would be given an opportunity for recourse when breaches do
occur.
In Part II, this Note first identifies the issue of the circuit split, providing
background on several cases that have come down to standing as an issue-
particularly as it relates to the imminence of a threat of data misuse. This Note
then provides background on the EU's GDPR, underscoring the aspects of
company regulation and citizens' rights that are most important for developing a
framework for legal action under the U.S. Constitution. Part II ends with a brief
review of international and domestic examples of laws that have used the GDPR
as a model. In Part III, this Note will identify the benefits of following the GDPR
while highlighting the pitfalls of allowing the circuits and individual states to
develop limited frameworks to address data privacy and protection. Specifically,
the U.S. must consider both international and domestic issues that point to the
GDPR as a gold standard for data protection regulation. Part IV concludes,
reiterating the need for a uniform federal framework that adequately protects
consumer rights while incentivizing businesses to comply.
II. BACKGROUND
The following sections lay the foundation for the argument that the
principles of the GDPR can be applied to an American constitutional framework
for standing in data breach cases. Section A explains the role that Article III
standing plays in bringing a cause of action under U.S. law, highlighting the
primary issue that data breach plaintiffs face at the pleading stage. Next, Section
B documents the circuit split in approaching the question of standing in several
notable cases. Finally, Section C identifies the history and purpose of the GDPR
before unpacking the clauses that are most relevant to organizations' obligations
and plaintiffs' rights post-breach.
[Vol. 123266
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A. Article III Standing Doctrine
In order for a federal court to establish jurisdiction over any litigation,17
a plaintiff must show that she has standing to sue,'8 meaning that the federal
court has the power to adjudicate her case, regardless of the strength of the
claim.19 The doctrine of standing is derived from the Constitution's division of
power between the legislative,20 executive,2 1 and judicial22 branches.23 While
Article III of the Constitution restricts federal court jurisdiction to "cases" and
"controversies," it does not expressly define these terms.24 As a result, the
Supreme Court has developed the doctrine of standing to both clarify the
boundaries of justiciability under Article III and to reinforce the "proper ... role
of the courts in a democratic society."25 Accordingly, to establish standing to sue
in a federal court, a plaintiff must show (1) that she has suffered an injury-in-
fact, (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and (3) that the injury
is redressable by a favorable judicial decision.26 In data breach litigation, the
most difficult requirement for plaintiffs to meet has most often been establishing
an injury-in-fact.
An injury-in-fact is "an invasion of a legally protected interest."2 7 The
injury must be "actual or imminent" and both "concrete" and "particularized."2 8
First, the alleged injury must be either actual-that is, the injury has occurred or
is ongoing-or it must be imminent.29 Second, a concrete injury must be de facto;
17 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998) (quoting Mansfield, C.
& L.M. Ry. Co. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382 (1884)) ("The requirement that jurisdiction be
established as a threshold matter 'spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the
United States' and is 'inflexible and without exception.').
18 Id. at 102.
19 Id at 89; Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) ("Jurisdiction ... is not defeated . .. by
the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could
actually recover.").
20 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
21 Id. art. 2, §1.
22 Id. art. 3, § 1.
23 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992).
24 Id
25 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
26 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
27 Id. at 560.
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it must actually exist and cannot be merely abstract.
30 Third, a particularized
injury "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."
31
While it is understandably difficult for plaintiffs to show that a data
breach actually exposed their private data in the first place, it is considerably
more difficult for plaintiffs to prove that the harm to their privacy is imminent.
Because the data cannot be shown to have already been misused in some
situations, plaintiffs are left to allege that there remains a threat of future injury.
However, "[a]n allegation of future injury" satisfies Article III only if it "is
'certainly impending,' or there is a 'substantial risk' that the harm will occur."
32
B. The Circuit Split on Article III Standing in Data Breach Cases
The circuits have split in their approaches to Article III standing with
regard to data breach plaintiffs. 33 In data breach cases, plaintiffs generally
attempt to establish standing on the theory that they suffer an increased risk of
identity theft following the breach.34 This is referred to as "increased-risk
standing," given the general inability to determine actual injury where the subject
of litigation is personal property existing in cyberspace. In the wake of the
Supreme Court's various takes on increased-risk standing in cases like Clapper
v. Amnesty International USA3 5 and Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
36 lower courts have
reached different conclusions about whether such injuries satisfy the standing
test.37 These holdings have been generally fact-dependent, focusing on either the
30 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
31 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1.
32 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty
Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 (2013)).
33 See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38,42 (3d Cir. 2011) (denying standing for data
breach plaintiffs); Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2007) (granting
standing for data breach plaintiffs).
34 See, e.g., Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
increased risk of identity theft was sufficient to confer standing).
35 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013) (holding that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing because they
alleged a risk of future harm).
36 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (finding the Ninth Circuit's Article III standing analysis was
incomplete because the court failed to consider the "concreteness" requirement of plaintiffs
alleged injury).
3 Compare Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 272 (4th Cir. 2017) (denying standing based on
the increased risk of identity theft arising out of two data breaches at a hospital, noting that the
threat of identity theft was based on a "highly attenuated chain of possibilities" (quoting Clapper
v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410 (2013))), with Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., L.L.C.,
794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (granting standing after a data breach based on the increased risk
of identity theft, noting that "[p]resumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make
fraudulent charges or assume those consumers' identities").
[Vol. 123268
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type of data that was stolen38 or whether the data was targeted and understood
by hackers.39 However, these decisions also represent the circuits' general
willingness or reluctance to recognize increased-risk standing, and, as such, they
are useful in analyzing plaintiffs' standing specific to data breach cases.
1. Standing Granted
Across the circuits that have granted Article III standing to data breach
victims, common themes can be traced throughout the courts' factual analyses of
each case. Notably, these circuits focus on (1) the type of information exposed
to cybercriminals and (2) the likelihood that such exposure necessarily presents
a valid concern regarding the imminence of claimed threats of future harm.
For example, in In re U.S. OPM, one class of plaintiffs claimed to have
suffered a variety of past and future data breach related harms in the wake of a
cyberattack on a federal personnel records database.40 Focusing on the plaintiffs'
shared injury of risk of future identity theft,4' the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit found that there was "no question" that
hackers gained access to "all the information needed to steal [the plaintiffs']
identities,"42 in addition to finding that some plaintiffs had already experienced
"various types of identity theft." 43 Reversing the district court's denial of
standing to this class of plaintiffs, the court held that the proven instances of
identity theft not only "illustrate[d] the nefarious uses to which [such] stolen
38 See, e.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771-72 (8th Cir. 2017) (rejecting increased-
risk standing for a class of plaintiffs whose credit and debit card information was stolen, but whose
personal identifying information was not stolen).
39 See, e.g., Beck, 848 F.3d at 275 (declining to assume that thieves targeted stolen laptops for
the personal information they contained); see also Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 40 (3d
Cir. 2011) (rejecting increased-risk standing after a hacker penetrated a payroll system firewall
because it was "not known whether the hacker read, copied, or understood" the system's
information).
40 For example, one plaintiff allegedly suffered stress "resulting from concerns for her personal
safety and that of her family members" after being informed by the FBI that her personal
identifying information "had been acquired by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham
('ISIS')." In re U.S. OPM, 928 F.3d 42, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing Arnold Plaintiffs' Compl. ¶
22).
41 The D.C. Circuit has previously recognized the risk of future identity theft as a "concrete
and particularized" injury for the purposes of Article III standing. Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d
620, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2017); see also Hancock v. Urb. Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511, 514 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (presenting the "increased risk of fraud or identity theft" as an "example" of a "concrete
consequence" for standing purposes).
42 In re US. OPM, 928 F.3d at 56 ("[T]he hackers [allegedly] stole Social Security numbers,
birth dates, fingerprints, and addresses, among other sensitive personal information. It hardly takes
a criminal mastermind to imagine how such information could be used to commit identity theft.").
43 Id. (referring to the "unauthorized opening of new credit card and other financial accounts
and the filing of fraudulent tax returns in [the affected plaintiffs'] names").
2020] 269
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information may be put," but that such instances also supported "the inference
that [the plaintiffs] face[d] a substantial-as opposed to a merely speculative or
theoretical-risk of future identity theft."
44 The D.C. Circuit had previously
granted standing on the issue in 2017, finding that "a substantial risk of harm
exist[ed] already, simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the
plaintiffs allege[d] was taken."
45
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has held Article III standing is satisfied in
data breach cases where the nature of the information breached raises concern
for the plaintiffs. 46 In Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,
47 plaintiffs
brought various claims, including alleged violations of the Federal Credit
Reporting Act ("FCRA"), that stemmed from a 2012 data breach where the
personal information of over one million Nationwide customers was allegedly
impacted.48 The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's partial dismissal of the
case, finding that the increased risk of identity fraud constituted sufficient
pleading of injury under Article III.
49 The court highlighted that "[w]here a data
breach targets personal information, a reasonable inference can be drawn that the
hackers will use the victims' data for . .. fraudulent purposes."
50
44 Id. ("[U]nlike existing credit card numbers, which, if compromised, can be changed to
prevent future fraud, Social Security numbers and addresses cannot so readily be swapped out for
new ones. And, of course, our birth dates and fingerprints are with us forever."); see also id. at 57
("Cyber-hacking on such a massive scale is a relatively new phenomenon, and we are unwilling at
this stage to assume that the passage of a year or two without any clearly identifiable pattern of
identity theft or financial fraud means that all those whose data was compromised are in the
clear.").
45 Attias, 865 F.3d at 629 (reversing the district court's dismissal for lack of standing where
plaintiffs in a class action suit against a health insurance company alleged that a data breach
compromised their personal identifying information). Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the
breach exposed "all of the information wrongdoers need for appropriation of a victim's identity":
personal identification information, credit card numbers, and Social Security numbers. Id. at 628
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re U.S. OPM, 928 F.3d at 55-56 ("Based largely
on the nature of the information compromised in the attack [in Attias], we concluded that it was
reasonable to infer that the cyberattackers had 'both the intent and the ability to use that data for
ill."' (internal citation omitted)). Ultimately, the court found that the plaintiffs had "cleared the low
bar to establish their standing at the pleading stage" by plausibly alleging that they faced a
substantial risk of identity theft as a result of the company's negligent failure to prevent the breach.
Attias, 865 F.3d at 622.
46 Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App'x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016).
47 663 F. App'x 384 (6th Cir. 2016).
48 Id. at 386.
49 Id at 388-89.
50 Id at 388.
[Vol. 123270
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The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have also recognized standing in several
data breach cases.5' In Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, L.L. C.,5 2 the plaintiffs
brought various claims stemming from a 2013 breach that compromised
information from approximately 350,000 customers' credit cards, 9,200 of which
were found to have been used fraudulently. 5 The Seventh Circuit reversed the
district court's dismissal, finding the plaintiffs had demonstrated an "objectively
reasonable likelihood" that harm would occur, and the plaintiffs had adequately
alleged standing under Article III.54 Perhaps the most important observation of
all the cases in this section, the court reasoned here that "customers should not
have to wait until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card fraud in order to
give the class standing."55
More recently, in In re Zappos.com, Inc.,56 class action plaintiffs
brought suit in the Ninth Circuit over a 2012 incident that allegedly resulted in
the compromise of personal information from Zappos' customers.57 Here, the
district court held that only plaintiffs claiming to have already suffered financial
losses resulting from the breach had standing to sue.58 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed, holding instead that even those plaintiffs who had only alleged
"imminent" financial losses also had sufficient standing to sue because
"substantial risk that the harm will occur" is sufficient to plead the injury
requirement for standing under Ninth Circuit precedent.59
2. Standing Denied
Circuits on the other side of the split have applied a much narrower
methodology regarding the pleading standards for an Article III injury-in-fact,
despite these cases involving the same types of sensitive information as discussed
in the previous section. Notably, these courts have been less likely to recognize
the threat of future harm or future risk of identity theft, especially where plaintiffs
have not yet experienced specific instances of harm.
51 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp.,
L.L.C., 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010);
Pisciotta v. Old Nat'l Bancorp, 499 F.3d 629 (7th Cir. 2007).
52 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2015).
5 Id. at 690.
54 Id. at 693 ("Why else would hackers break into a ... database and steal consumers' private
information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges
or assume those consumers' identities.").
5 Id.
56 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018).
5 Id. at 1023.
58 Id. at 1024.
59 Id. at 1025-26.
2020] 271
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In Beck v. McDonald, a laptop containing patients' unencrypted personal
information and several boxes of medical records went missing from a South
Carolina Veterans Affairs medical center on two separate occasions in 2013 and
2014, respectively.60 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
these claims, holding that the increased risk of future harm of identity theft was
insufficient to demonstrate injury-in-fact and specifically noting that the inability
to point to a proven instance of identity theft three to four years after the breaches
in question illustrated the "speculative" nature of the plaintiffs' claimed
injuries.61 In contrast, in 2018, the Fourth Circuit reversed a district court's
dismissal of a complaint on standing grounds because the plaintiffs could point
to specific instances where their personal information had been used
fraudulently. 62
A comparable case, In re SuperValu, Inc.,63 centered on a plaintiff's
allegations that a 2014 breach resulted in the compromise of credit card and
personal information belonging to SuperValu customers.64 Here, the Eighth
Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, stating that plaintiffs could not
"manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their
fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending."65 However,
one plaintiff was allowed to proceed with his claims by alleging fraudulent
charges had already been made to his credit card account following the breach.
66
In Reilly v. Ceridian Corp.,67 the Third Circuit affirmed a district court's
dismissal of a case involving the breach of a payroll processing firm's database
because plaintiffs could only show a "hypothetical, future injury" that was
insufficient to demonstrate standing.68 Rather, the court held that plaintiffs would
have to present evidence that the personal information allegedly exposed had
been "read, copied, and understood" and subsequently used "successfully" by
the "hacker." 69 More recently, the Third Circuit reversed a district court's
dismissal of data breach litigation on standing grounds in In re Horizon
60 Id. at 267-69. The information on the laptop included patients' "names, birth dates, the last
four digits of social security numbers, and physical descriptors," while the boxes of medical
records contained patients' names and social security numbers. Id.
61 Without such allegations, the Fourth Circuit explained, there was nothing to "push the
threatened injury of future identity theft beyond the speculative to the sufficiently imminent." Id.
at 274.
62 Hutton v. Nat'l Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 622 (4th Cir. 2018).
63 870 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017).
" Id at 766-67.
65 Id. at 771 (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 586 U.S. 398, 415 (2013)).
66 Id at 772-74.
67 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).
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Healthcare Services Inc. Data Breach Litigation,70 holding that plaintiffs
successfully pled a de facto concrete injury-in-fact due to defendant Horizon's
alleged statutory violation.71
Finally, the Second Circuit aligned with the other courts in this section
when it held in Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc.,72 that the district court properly
dismissed a case for lack of standing because the plaintiff had not suffered a
"particularized and concrete injury" where fraudulent charges had been
reimbursed following a 2014 data breach affecting credit card information
belonging to Michaels Stores' customers.73 The court further observed that the
plaintiff could not plausibly allege a risk of future harm when her credit card had
been promptly cancelled and no other personal information had been claimed as
stolen after the breach.74
Despite the circuit courts of appeals' failure to reach a clear consensus
on the issue of standing specific to data breach plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has
thus far declined to clarify this issue. 5 After denying a petition for certiorari in
the Fourth Circuit's Beck case in June 2017,76 the Court denied another petition
for certiorari in Attias v. CareFirst, Inc. 77 during the 2017-18 term, permitting
the D.C. Circuit's holding to stand as well. Recently, the Court denied a petition
for certiorari regarding the Ninth Circuit's In re Zappos. com, Inc. case in March
2019.78 Consequently, holdings from both sides of the split remain good law,
keeping all present and future litigants bound to the whims of the circuits.
C. The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation
In May 2018, the GDPR entered into force across the EU.79 The
Regulation applies to (1) all companies or entities which process personal data
as part of the activities of one of their branches established in the EU, regardless
of where the data is processed; or (2) companies established outside the EU that
offer goods and/or services (paid or for free) or that monitor the behavior of
70 846 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2017).
71 Id. at 635.
72 689 Fed. App'x 89 (2d Cir. 2017).
73 Id. at 90.
74 Id.
75 See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
76 See Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 268 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied sub nom. Beck v.
Shulkin, No. 16-1328, 2017 WL 1740442 (U.S. June 26, 2017).
77 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 981 (2018) (Mem.).
78 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1373 (2019).
79 Ben Wolford, What Is the GDPR, the EU's New Data Protection Law?, GDPR,
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/?cn-reloaded=1 (last visited Sept. 23, 2020).
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individuals in the EU.80 However, if processing personal data does not constitute
a core part of the business and the activity does not create risks for individuals,
then some obligations of the GDPR do not apply to the company.
81 Processing
personal data is regarded as one of a company's "core activities" where it forms
"an inextricable part of the controller's or processor's activities."
82
Under the Regulation, a "personal data breach" is defined as "a breach
of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration,
unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored or
otherwise processed."83 One of the most relevant aspects of the GDPR to the
American legal system is that "data subjects"-people whose data is processed
by a company subject to the Regulation-are recognized as having a right to be
provided with effective and enforceable rights and effective administrative and
judicial redress both before, during, and after a breach occurs. This concept is
expressly included throughout the Regulation. For example, in the Regulation's
preamble, the Drafters acknowledge that data breaches may result in "physical,
material or non-material damage" to data subjects, such as "loss of control over
personal data or limitation of their rights, discrimination, identity theft or fraud,
financial loss, unauthorized reversal of pseudonymisation, damage to reputation,
loss of confidentiality of personal data protected by professional secrecy or any
other significant economic or social disadvantage."84
Not only are data breach victims' potential harms outlined as an
underlying purpose for the Regulation's rules on data processing companies, but
companies' obligations to notify both an authoritative body and breach victims
about a breach are also enumerated within Articles 33 and 34, respectively.
Under Article 33, in the event of a personal data breach the data
"controller," or company that possessed the data, must notify a supervisory
authority about the breach "without undue delay and, where feasible, not later
than 72 hours after having become aware of [the breach]."
85 This is the default
rule under the Regulation, unless the breach is "unlikely to result in a risk to the
80 Who Does the Data Protection Law Apply To?, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-and-
organisations/application-regulation/who-does-data-protection-law-apply_en (last visited Sept. 6,
2020).
81 See id. For example, the appointment of a Data Protection Officer ("DPO") would not apply
to a company whose "core activities" do not include processing personal data and where the
company's activities do not create risks for individuals. Id.
82 Id.
83 General Data Protection Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J.
(L 119) 1, 34 (EU) [hereinafter GDPR].
84 Id.185.
85 Id. art. 33(1).
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rights and freedoms of natural persons."86 If the notification is not made within
72 hours, the company must additionally communicate the reasons for the
delay.87 Where the breach is first discovered by an entity designated as the
"processor" for the controlling company, the processor "shall notify the
controller without undue delay after becoming aware of [the breach]."88 It is also
important to note that these notifications must be detailed to some extent,89 and
when companies are unable to communicate all required information at once,
they are permitted to release details in phases so as to remain in compliance with
the Regulation without needlessly delaying the process of redress.
Under Article 34, a data controller is obliged to communicate data
breaches to victims "without undue delay" when such a breach "is likely to result
in a high risk to the [victims'] rights and freedoms."90 The notification to the
victim is required to describe "in clear and plain language" the nature of the
breach, and, while it does not have to outline the overarching statistical
information related to the breach, it should at least
(b) communicate the name and contact details of the data
protection officer or other contact point where more information
can be obtained; (c) describe the likely consequences of the
personal data breach; (d) describe the measures taken or
proposed to be taken by the controller to address the personal
data breach, including, where appropriate, measures to mitigate
its possible adverse effects.9 1
However, companies are still given a degree of leeway in the notification
process regarding victim communication. Specifically, no notification is required
if "appropriate technical and organizational protection measures" such as
encryption were in place and applied to the data affected by the breach;
subsequent measures were taken to mitigate the likelihood of "high risk to the
86 Id
87 Id
88 Id. art. 33(2).
89 Id. art. 33(3). Specifically, the notification to the supervisory authority must:
(a) describe the nature of the personal data breach including where possible,
the categories and approximate number of data subjects concerned and the
categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned; (b)
communicate the name and contact details of the data protection officer or
other contact point where more information can be obtained; (c) describe the
likely consequences of the personal data breach; (d) describe the measures
taken or proposed to be taken by the controller to address the personal data
breach, including, where appropriate, measures to mitigate its possible adverse
effects.
Id.
90 Id art. 34(1).
91 Id art. 34(2).
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rights and freedoms" of victims; or where such notification would involve
"disproportionate effort." 92 As a last resort, should a company have failed to
communicate information regarding a breach to victims, the supervisory
authority, "having considered the likelihood of the personal data breach resulting
in a high risk,"93 may require the company to fulfill its obligations or may
determine that the notification is not required under the Regulation. For example,
the need to mitigate an immediate risk of damage would call for prompt
communication with data subjects whereas the need to implement appropriate
measures against continuing or similar personal data breaches may justify more
time for communication.94
After the notification process has been carried out, eligible breach
victims are afforded the right to compensation under Article 82, regardless of
whether the damage suffered was material or non-material.
95 In addition, any
data controller involved in processing shall be liable for the damage caused
where it has not complied with its obligations under the Regulation or where it
has acted outside or contrary to lawful instructions of the controller.
96 A
controller or processor is "exempt from liability ... if it proves that it is not in
any way responsible for the event giving rise to the damage."
97 In the event that
more than one controller or processor (or both a controller and a processor) are
involved in the same processing and where they are responsible for any damage
caused by processing, each entity is held liable for the entirety of the damage
caused "to ensure effective compensation of the data subject."
98 Finally, where
one controller or processor has fully compensated victims for the damage
suffered, that controller or processor becomes legally entitled to make a
compensatory claim against the other controllers or processors involved in the
incident, proportional to each party's responsibility.
99
92 Id. art. 34(3). In cases where disproportionate effort would be required on the part of the
company to notify breach victims, a public communication or similar measure whereby victims
are informed in an equally effective manner is instead required. Id.
93 Id. art. 34(4).
94 Id.¶86.
95 Id art. 82(1).
96 Id. art. 82(2).
97 Id. art. 82(3).
98 Id. art. 82(4). This style of shared liability could be especially effective in the U.S. torts
system, where it is helpful for defendants to show that a breach was the result of multiple actors,
thereby reducing the cost of settlement. See infra Section III.A.2.
99 GDPR, supra note 83, art. 82(5). Again, this clause closely resembles the U.S. civil tort
system, where defendants sharing liability can become indebted to one defendant who fully
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D. International Iterations of the GDPR
Since it took legal effect in 2018, the GDPR has emerged as a reference
point and acted as a catalyst for many countries around the world contemplating
how to modernize their privacy rules. These include Chile, 0 0 South Korea,' 0'
Japan,0 2 Kenya,103 Tunisia,'04 Indonesia, 0 5 and Taiwan,106 to name just a few.
International instruments, such as the modernized "Convention 108" of the
Council of Europe,107 or the "Data Free Flow with Trust" initiative launched by
Japan108 are also based on principles that are shared by the GDPR. Notably,
Brazil and India, key players on the international stage, have also promulgated
laws that tailor the GDPR framework to their domestic goals. Because each of
these countries is comparable to the U.S. in size and international stature, this
section briefly describes each country's iteration of the GDPR framework.
00 See Data Protection Laws of the World: Chile, DLA PIPER,
https://www.dlapiperdataprotection.com/index.html?t-law&c=CL (Jan. 14, 2020).
101 Chris H. Kang, Sun Hee Kim & Doil Son, Korea Introduces Major Amendments to Data
Privacy Laws, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=223051 e2-0346-4935-8fbb-6146e4424d94.
102 Hiroto Imai, Kyle Reykalin & Mitsuhiro Yoshimura, Update of Japan's Privacy Law
Approved by Cabinet, HOGAN LOVELLS: ENGAGE (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.engage.hoganlovells.com/knowledgeservices/news/update-of-j apans-privacy-law-
approved-by-cabinet.
103 George Obulutsa & Duncan Miriri, Kenya Passes Data Protection Law Crucial for Tech
Investments, REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2019, 8:52 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-
dataprotection/kenya-passes-data-protection-law-crucial-for-tech-investments-
idUSKBN1XIIO1.
104 Henning Haake, The GDPR's Extra-Territorial Reach - Data Protection in Tunisia,
EUROFORUM (Mar. 1, 2017), https://www.euroforum.de/edpd/gdpr-extra-territorial-reach-data-
protection-tunisia/.
'05 Michael S. Carl & Revaldi N. Wirabuana, With GDPR as Guide, Indonesia Nears Major
Changes to Rights of Personal Data Owners, LEXOLOGY (June 8, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g-463 80fe5-c 1 8e-497a-bdal -39f68c88b490.
106 Central News Agency, EU Lauds Taiwan's Efforts To Push for Talks on Data Transfer
Deal, TAIWAN NEWS (Mar. 11, 2019, 6:01PM),
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3655633.
107 See COUNCIL OF EUR. TREATY OFF., Details of Treaty No. 108: Convention for the Protection
of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data,
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/108 (last visited Sept. 6,
2020).
108 WORLD ECON. F., DATA FREE FLOW WITH TRUST (DFFT): PATHS TOWARDS FREE AND
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1. Brazil's General Data Protection Law
Brazil's Lei Geral de Protegao de Dados10
9 ("LGPD"), passed shortly
after the GDPR in 2018, attempts to unify over 40 different statutes that currently
govern personal data-both online and offline. This unification of previously
disparate and oftentimes contradictory regulations is only one similarity it shares
with its inspiration, the EU's GDPR.1 0 In addition to its purpose, the LGPD
follows the GDPR in that it applies to any entity that processes Brazilians'
personal data, regardless of where that business or organization might actually
be located."' Furthermore, the LGPD provides data subjects with essentially the
same fundamental rights as the GDPR. 2 While the LGPD does distinguish
between "personal data" and "sensitive personal data,""
3 it appears to take a
more expansive approach than the GDPR with regard to what can constitute
personal data. In various places throughout the text, the law states that personal
data can mean any data that, by itself or combined with other data, could identify
a natural person or subject them to a specific treatment.
Though the LGPD and GDPR are quite similar in various ways, they
diverge in three key areas. First, the GDPR has six lawful bases for processing,"
4
and a data controller must choose one of them as a justification for using a data
subject's information. However, the LGPD lists ten,"
5 notably including the
protection of credit as a legal basis for the processing of data, which is a
substantial departure from the GDPR. Second, the laws vary in their
requirements for reporting of data breaches. While both laws require entities to
report data breaches to a local data protection authority, the level of specificity
varies widely. The GDPR is explicit: an organization must report a data breach
within 72 hours of its discovery." 6 In contrast, the LGPD does not give a firm
deadline: breaches must be communicated merely within a reasonable time
109 Lei Geral de Protegao de Dados Pessoais (General Data Protection Law), Law No.
13,709/2018, [hereinafter LGPD],
https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Brazilian_General_Data_Protection Law.pdf (last
visited Sept. 6, 2020).
110 Richie Koch, What Is the LGPD? Brazil's Version of the GDPR, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/gdpr-vs-lgpd/?cn-reloaded=l (last visited Sept. 6, 2020).
"1 LGPD, supra note 109, art. 3.
112 Id. art. 18. While the GDPR is known for granting its data subjects eight fundamental rights,
they are essentially the same rights the LGPD mentions. The LGPD grants nine fundamental rights,
appearing to distinguish "[t]he right to information about public and private entities with which the
controller has shared data" from the GDPR's more general "[r]ight to be informed" to make this
right more explicit.
113 Id. art. 5(I)-(II) (emphasis added).
114 GDPR, supra note 83, Recital 40, art. 6.
115 LGPD, supra note 109, art. 7.
116 GDPR, supra note 83, art. 33.
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period." 7 This will be left to the national regulating body to further define the
scope of "reasonable." Finally, there is a stark contrast in the laws' maximum
fines imposed on violating entities. The GDPR famously imposes substantial
maximum fines,'"8 while the LGPD's maximum fines are only half as much." 19
2. India's Proposed Personal Data Protection Bill
In 2017, India's Supreme Court established a constitutional right to
privacy.120 A first draft of India's proposed Personal Data Protection Bill
("PDPB")121 soon followed in late 2019. Like the GDPR, in practice, India's bill
would require global internet companies like Facebook and Amazon to seek
explicit permission for most uses of an individual's personal data and make it
easier for people to demand that their data be erased.'2 2 While the data protection
rules would apply to government agencies as well as private companies, the law
would still grant the central government power to exempt any public entity from
these requirements for reasons such as national security or public order.'2 3 The
PDPB also proposes a new entity, the Data Protection Authority, to write specific
rules, monitor how corporations are applying them and settle disputes.2 4
Interestingly, the PDPB would also require critical personal data to be stored on
servers within India, with constraints on the transfer of other personal data
outside India. 25
Though the PDPB imposes typical penalties that include the prohibition
of data processing and financial consequences for noncompliance,126 it differs
from the GDPR in some respects. Most significantly, the bill not only provides
for criminal penalties for harms arising from violations,127 but it also proposes to
treat the relationship between a data processor and its consumer as "fiduciary." 28
"7 LGPD, supra note 109, art. 48 ("[T]he controller must communicate to the national authority
and to the data subject the occurrence of a security incident that may create risk or relevant damage
to the data subjects ... in a reasonable time period, as defined by the national authority.").
118 Infra Section IllA.
119 See LGPD, supra note 109, art. 52. The maximum fine for a violation is "2% of a private
legal entity's, group's, or conglomerate's revenue in Brazil, for the prior fiscal year, excluding
taxes, up to a total maximum of 50 million reals." Id.
120 Geeta Pandey, Indian Supreme Court in Landmark Ruling on Privacy, BBC (Aug. 24,
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-41033954.
121 The Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019, Bill No. 373 of 2019, (India).
122 See id. cl. 7, 11, 20.
123 See id. cl. 35-40.
124 See id cl. 41-56.
125 Id. cI. 33-34.
126 Id. cl. 57-61.
127 Id. cl. 82.
128 Id. cl. 3(13).
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E. The California Consumer Privacy Act
While the U.S. is free to take notes from Brazil and India's developing
legal frameworks, there is a version of the GDPR that is much closer to home,
and which will likely provide the best foundation for building up a national
framework modeled after the GDPR. The California Consumer Privacy Act
("CCPA" or "the Act") officially took effect on January 1, 2020.129 Originally
enacted in 2018, the CCPA creates new consumer rights for California citizens
relating to the access to, deletion of, and sharing of personal information
collected by businesses.130 While the CCPA and the GDPR are separate legal
frameworks with different scopes, definitions, and requirements, the CCPA
reflects a significant number of provisions and goals already present in the
GDPR. Namely, the Act grants consumers
[t]he right to know what personal information is collected, used,
shared or sold, both as to the categories and specific pieces of
personal information;
[t]he right to delete personal information held by businesses and
by extension, a business's service provider;
[t]he right to opt-out of sale of personal information.. .[; and]
[t]he right to non-discrimination in terms of price or service
when a consumer exercises a privacy right under [the Act].
131
Like the GDPR, the CCPA only applies to businesses that meet certain
criteria regarding revenue and data control. Specifically, a business will be
subject to the CCPA if it (1) generates "annual gross revenues in excess of [$25
million]"; (2) "buys, receives ... sells, or shares .. . the personal information of
50,000 or more consumers, households, or devices"; and/or (3) "derives 50[%]
or more of its annual revenues from selling consumers' personal information."'
32
California State Attorney General Xavier Becerra's final proposed draft
regulations also seek to impose additional obligations on businesses that collect
and manage the personal information of more than ten million consumers.1
33 Just
129 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-80 (West 2020).
130 For a further breakdown of the CCPA and the ways in which consumers may take advantage
of their rights under the new law, see Geoffrey A. Fowler, Don't Sell My Data! We Finally Have




131 CCPA Fact Sheet, CAL. DEP'T OF JUST.,
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/CCPA%2OFact%20Sheet%20%28000
00002%29.pdf (last visited Oct. 24, 2020).
132 CAL. CIV. CODE @ 1798.140(c)(1)(A)-(C).
133 Namely, throughout the proposed regulations, the California Attorney General imposes an
obligation on companies to retain certain documentation regarding CCPA compliance from
consumer requests to documentation of compliance for some period of time; often two years.
However, the proposed regulations also create an affirmative reporting requirement for a business
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like the GDPR, the CCPA applies to California companies and any out-of-state
entities whose business touches California consumers.3 4
However, the CCPA stands firmly apart from the GDPR in several ways.
First, the law does not require companies to minimize the amount of data they
collect in the first place. 135 In addition, companies do not have to share
information with consumers that is already public, that has been collected in a
job interview, or that has been aggregated in ways that do not identify individual
consumers. 136 And businesses already covered by some existing privacy laws are
exempt-even if those laws don't require the same transparency as the CCPA.137
Significantly, the CCPA does not create an individual claim to file a lawsuit
against a company that violates consumers' privacy rights. For now, only the
California attorney general may bring a claim to enforce the CCPA,13' a fact that
is lamentable from a consumer advocacy perspective.
III. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR NATIONAL UNIFORMITY
A. The GDPR as the Gold Standard of Data Protection
Given the GDPR's status as a newly-enacted law, there is limited case
law showing how the Regulation has been applied in the specific context of data
breach cases. In almost all of these cases, massive fines have been leveled against
companies that were found to have failed in taking the appropriate measure to
adequately protect consumers' stored data.139 The maximum GDPR fines are
that "alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for the business's commercial purposes,
sells, or shares for commercial purposes the personal information of' ten million or more
consumers. Companies that do so must compile metrics related to (1) the number of requests to
know that the business received, complied with and denied; (2) the number of requests to delete
the business received, complied with and denied; (3) the number of requests to opt-out received,
complied with and denied; and (4) the median number of days within which the business
substantively responded to each request. These metrics then must be reported either in a company's
privacy policy or otherwise posted on the company website with a link to the separate page in the
privacy policy. See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 999.317(g) (2020). The text of the final proposed
regulations is more easily accessible through the Attorney General's website at
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/oal-sub-final-text-of-regs.pdf.
1 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g).
135 Id. § 1798.100(b).
136 Id. §§ 1798.140(o)(2), 1798.145(a)(5).
137 Id. § 1798.145(c)-(f). These laws include the federal GLBA and HIPAA, meaning that
banks and doctor's offices generally do not have to abide by the CCPA because they are already
subject to a national privacy law. See infra Section III.C.1.
138 CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.150(b).
139 See Vera Cherepanova, GDPR Enforcement Report (May 2019), FCPA BLOG (May 14,
2019, 8:18 AM), https://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2019/5/14/gdpr-enforcement-report-may-
2019.html; Oliver Schmidt, Germany's First Fine Under the GDPR Offers Enforcement Insights,
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substantial, requiring organizations that commit "grave" GDPR violations to pay
to up to E 20 million or 4% of their annual global revenue, whichever is higher.'
40
In practice, these outcomes and other enforcement measures have
appeared to serve as a deterrent for companies that are non-compliant in some
way, while showing breach victims just how valuable their data is worth and
validating a consumer's right to maintain some kind of control over his or her
data. It is no wonder that the GDPR has been referred to as the "gold standard"
for data privacy rights enforcement. 4[
B. Applying the GDPR to the Federal Circuit Split
If the U.S. were already following such principles of deterrence, coupled
with uniform and concrete rights for data subjects, there likely would not be a
circuit split with regard to whether consumers have standing in data breach cases.
Defendant businesses would have hopefully been deterred by such a high
potential fine for noncompliance, for one. In addition, even if the breaches had
still occurred, affected consumers would have been able to exercise clearer rights
with regard to protecting their data and receiving appropriate remedy. Most
importantly, a federal law allowing consumers to bring a cause of action for a
business's failure to timely notify them of the breach-for example-would have
created a clear basis for Constitutional standing by statutorily recognizing the
threat of data misuse as an imminent and concrete injury-in-fact.
A GDPR-type framework does not only benefit victims of breaches but
can also provide some support for defendant data collectors that use third-party
processors. For instance, the GDPR provides for liability-sharing where multiple
defendants may be at fault for failure to comply with different aspects of the law,
resulting in a breach.14 2 Liabilty-sharing is not a new concept to the U.S. torts
system, where defendants can sometimes reduce the cost of settlement or the
impact of an unfavorable verdict by showing that a cause of action was the result
of multiple actors' negligent activities, thereby escaping the full brunt of
liability. 4 3 In data breach cases, where the penalties associated with
noncompliance are more often than not massive fines, this aspect of the data
privacy framework would likely be a welcome addition to federal U.S. law.
IAPP.ORG (Nov. 27, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/germanys-first-fine-under-the-gdpr-offers-
enforcement-insights/.
140 Ben Wolford, What Are the GDPR Fines?, GDPR.EU, https://gdpr.eu/fines/ (last visited
Sept. 6, 2020).
141 HIMSS TV, GDPR is Gold Standard for How Companies Should Be Governing Data, MOBI
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 25, 2019, 8:53 AM), https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/gdpr-gold-
standard-how-companies-should-be-governing-data.
142 See GDPR, supra note 83, art. 82(4), (5).
1 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17 (AM. L. INST. 2000).
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C. Other Domestic Considerations
Aside from the lessons that can be learned from directly applying the
European GDPR to American case law, the U.S. could additionally learn from
domestic laws, state developments, and current business practices that all point
to the practicality of adopting a national framework for the protection of private
consumer data. First, the U.S. already applies national standards to financial and
medical information that are fairly similar to those regulated by the GDPR.'44
Second, the entry into force of California's new Consumer Privacy Act may
inspire other impatient states to take legal action within their own jurisdictions
to protect consumers' data-with the potential to add to the confusion and
injustice already created by the circuit split. Finally, because the GDPR applies
to all businesses whose data collection practices affect EU citizens, many
American entities already have measures in place to ensure their compliance with
the Regulation.145 With the addition of new state laws creating similar-yet-
different rules for these same businesses to catch up with, it seems more practical
now than ever for the U.S. to adopt a uniform, national framework that mirrors
what has already been done while making it easier for businesses to remain
compliant with American law.
1. Current Legal Standards for Financial and Medical Information
Although there is currently no general federal security breach
notification law, the U.S. has enacted laws pertaining to the privacy and security
of personal information in the areas of financial institutions and medical
information, as well as adopted security breach notification regulations for both
of these industries.
Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA")' 46 in an
effort to ensure that financial institutions adequately protect consumers' personal
financial information. The GLBA restricts such institutions from disclosing
financial information to third parties without providing notification to
consumers. 147 Pursuant to the GLBA, the Office of the Comptroller of Currency,
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision promulgated the Interagency
Guidance on Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer
144 STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, WILSON C. FREEMAN & CHRIS D. LINEBAUGH, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERV., DATA PROTECTION LAW: AN OVERVIEW 7-12 (2019).
145 See GDPR Compliance Checklist for US Companies, GDPR.EU,
https://gdpr.eu/compliance-checklist-us-companies/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2020); infra Section
III.C.3.1.
146 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6801-09 (West 2020).
4 Id. § 6802.
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Information and Customer Notice, 148 which is very similar to most current state
security breach notification laws. However, because it is a federal regulation, it
is not really limited in scope or jurisdiction, unlike state laws and circuit
precedent.
The Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") has issued
comparable regulations requiring health care providers, health plans and other
entities covered by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 ("HIPAA")' 49 to notify individuals if their personal health information has
been breached.15 0 In this context, a breach is defined as the "acquisition, access,
use, or disclosure of protected health information, which poses a significant risk
of financial, reputational, or other harm to an individual."'
5' Furthermore, the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") promulgated the Health Breach Notification
Rule, which applies specifically to foreign and domestic vendors of personal
health records, related entities, and third-party service providers that maintain
information belonging to U.S. citizens or residents.
5 2 The FTC's notification
procedure and requirements essentially mirror the DHHS regulations, except
notification is to be made to the FTC. 5 3 A violation of this rule is considered an
unfair or deceptive act or practice in violation of the Federal Trade Commission
Act regarding unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
5 4
2. Extending CCPA Rights Beyond California
The CCPA really only applies to businesses whose data collecting
processes touch and concern California residents, but this has not stopped some
businesses from individually choosing to extend these rights beyond California's
borders. For example, businesses like Netflix, Microsoft, Starbucks and United
Postal Service are extending CCPA rights to all Americans."
1 5 This makes sense:
it takes additional time and resources for companies to attempt to confirm where
their consumers live, and it is far easier for a business to broadly apply a law like
the CCPA rather than attempt to implement separate policies and procedures for
monitoring a restricted class on consumers. Perhaps more obviously, it would be
hypocritical for companies to claim to care about consumer privacy while
148 70 Fed. Reg. 15736 (Mar. 29, 2005) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 30, 208, 225, 364, 568,
570).
149 Pub. L. No. 140-191, 110 Stat. 1938 (1996).
150 45 C.F.R. @§ 164.400-164.414 (2020).
151 Id. § 164.402.
152 16 C.F.R. §§ 318.1-318.9 (2020).
13 See id. § 318.3.
14 15 U.S.C.A. § 57a (West 2020); 16 C.F.R. § 318.7.
'5 Julie Brill, Microsoft Will Honor California's New Privacy Rights Throughout he United
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simultaneously discriminating against Americans based on their place of
residence.
Many other companies have previously indicated that they would
participate in widespread data privacy protection for consumers, but only once
Congress has passed a federal data privacy law.' 56 Unless the federal government
is willing to recognize the merits of the GDPR and adapt those principles to a
national framework, this is not likely to happen anytime soon.5 7 As such, while
consumers outside California may be able to reap the benefits provided by the
CCPA, this is currently only on a company-by-company basis rather than
federally mandated. For this and other reasons discussed in the next section, the
CCPA may actually end up doing more harm than good in the realm of both
consumer rights and business interests.
i. State Action May Do More Harm Than Good
The CCPA is an important step forward in the move toward increased
consumer protection in the realm of data privacy.' 58 However, the Act is limited
in scope and could actually mark the beginning of a more confusing era for
enforcing consumer rights. As such, the potential impact of the CCPA on the
already-confusing world of American data protection is important to consider in
showing the significance of creating a federal framework that puts an American
spin on the GDPR.
Though the CCPA has only been in force since January 1, 2020, practical
limitations on enforcement already abound. 159 First, state enforcement of the Act
will be limited for several months, and even after this "grace period" it is unclear
how strictly the Act will be able to be enforced by the Attorney General's office.
Second, while businesses have already begun the process of notifying
Californian consumers of their rights under the CCPA and implementing
measures to ensure compliance with the CCPA as it relates to California
156 Cat Zakrzewski & Derek Hawkins, Tech Executives Voice Support for National Privacy
Law, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2018, 11:09 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2018/09/26/tech-executives-voice-support-national-
privacy-law/.
1s7 Tony Romm, Top Senate Democrats Unveil New Online Privacy Bill, Promising Tough
Penalties for Data Abuse, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2019, 7:45 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/1 1 /26/top-senate-democrats-unveil-new-
online-privacy-bill-promising-tough-penalties-data-abuse/.
158 For example, the CCPA has already revealed that Amazon keeps a record of everything
customers do on a Kindle, from the moment a person starts and stops reading to when a person
highlights a word. Kari Paul, "They Know Us Better Than We Know Ourselves ": How Amazon
Tracked My Last Two Years of Reading, GUARDIAN (Feb. 3, 2020, 3:01 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/feb/03/amazon-kindle-data-reading-tracking-
privacy.
159 Infra Section II.C.2.ii.
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consumers,160 actual disclosures in response to CCPA requests have not been
handled as efficiently.1 6'
Finally, California's legacy as a trailblazer in passing novel laws could
very well continue with the CCPA, creating a domino effect across the U.S.
6 2
This may be one of the clearest ways in which the CCPA could eventually cause
more harm than good in the realm of securing consumer data privacy rights. If
more states pass laws that mimic-but do not reiterate-California's law, then
the U.S. will find itself grappling with the most confusing data privacy regime in
the world rather than bringing justice to consumers across the nation.
ii. Practical Limitations of State-Specific Data Privacy
Laws
The clearest limitation the CCPA faces is its lack of individual
enforcement procedures. Because the Act only creates a right for the State
Attorney General to file claims against companies allegedly in violation of
consumers' rights, it will likely be difficult for individuals to seek redress on
their own. Furthermore, the Attorney General's right to bring an enforcement
action under the CCPA only took effect on July 1, 2020.163 However, at present,
current Attorney General Xavier Becerra's office must first send businesses
warnings that they might be in violation of the law, allowing them 30 days to fix
any issues before fines or lawsuits are contemplated. '" In the meantime,
numerous class actions have already been initiated in California courts,
1 65 while
projections indicate that there will only be about two dozen agents assigned to
enforcing the Act-in a state with 40 million people-and California's
Supervising Deputy Attorney General on Consumer Protection previosuly
indicated she will likely have the capacity to prosecute "just three cases per
160 The Author, a California resident, received an abundance of email communications in the
weeks leading up to January 1, 2020, notifying her of changes to various companies' Privacy
Policies and Consent Preferences options in response to the CCPA's scheduled date of effect.
161 Greg Bensinger, So Far, Under California's New Privacy Law, Firms Are Disclosing Too
Little Data-Or Far Too Much, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2020, 7:44 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2020/01/2 1 /ccpa-transparency/.
162 Infra Section Il.C.3.iii.
163 CCPA Fact Sheet, supra note 131.
64 See Rachel Lerman, California Begins Enforcing Digital Privacy Law, Despite Calls for
Delay, WASH. POST (July 1, 2020, 7:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/
2 020/07/01/ccpa-enforcement-california/
(additionally highlighting that businesses have already asked for, and been denied, extensions of
the CCPA's original six-month "grace period" for compliance in light of the COVID-19
pandemic).
165 See generally Alysa Zeltzer Hutnik, Paul A. Rosenthal, Tara Marciano & William Pierotti,
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year." 166 In the months since July 2020, the Office of the Attorney General has
already followed up on claims of potential violations,167 but it is unclear how
many Californians will succeed on claims within the confines of the system.'68
While some businesses are extending CCPA rights beyond California's
borders,169 other companies run the spectrum from coming up short in what they
actually disclose, to overwhelming consumers with too much information.'70
This is an issue that other potential state laws will run into as businesses begin to
interpret and test the bounds of privacy and protection laws.
iii. The Dangers of a "Domino Effect"
It is unsurprising that California is the first state to pass such a law. The
state contributes to a significant portion of the Ninth Circuit's caseload, and the
Ninth Circuit falls on the side of the split championing plaintiffs' rights to sue in
data breach cases on the basis of the threat of future harm. Moreover, California
has often been a leader in passing novel laws that address modern issues. As a
result, the CCPA has the potential to become a model statute for other states
seeking to take a firmer stance on the issue of data breaches and the protection
of consumer privacy. While this could serve to introduce more measures into the
U.S. that mirror the GDPR, this is not necessarily a good thing. Because no two
laws can seemingly ever be completely alike, businesses that are already
compliant with the GDPR-but are now subject to the CCPA as well-may still
find themselves facing additional obligations under California's law. If other
states follow California's model and create specific laws limited to their own
territories, then the U.S. could end up with multiple data protection frameworks
that overlap or-even worse--contradict one another.
66 Bensinger, supra note 161.
167 See Stacey Gray, Off to the Races for Enforcement of California's Privacy Law, FUTURE
PRiv. F. (July 10, 2020), https://fpf.org/2020/07/10/off-to-the-races-for-enforcement-of-
californias-privacy-law/.
168 It is worth noting that the California Privacy Rights Act ("CPRA"), also known as Prop. 24,
will appear on the November 3, 2020, ballot. The CPRA seeks to fix several problems remaining
in the CCPA and promises short-term consumer benefits, but it has come under scrutiny for the
lack of certainty provided on long-term privacy impacts. See Maureen Mahoney, CPRA Promises
Short-Term Consumer Benefits, Long-Term Uncertainty, IAPP (July 22, 2020),
https://iapp.org/news/a/cpra-promises-short-term-consumer-benefits-long-term-uncertainty/.
169 Infra Section III.C.2.iv.
170 Bensinger, supra note 161. For example, Uber and Lyft maintain troves of personal data
collected from customers' accounts, but both companies failed to include some of this information
in CCPA requests-such as ratings information and customer service calls. Id. In the same vein,
Amazon has yet to share what data it collects in its camera-equipped convenience stores, according
to some requests. Fowler, supra note 130. On the other hand, Twitter's initial method for
responding to requests was to send users "a file in a JavaScript format that is difficult for non-
techies to open." Bensinger, supra note 161.
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An increased number of nuanced or conflicting state data protection laws
that are limited in application will only cause more confusion, especially within
the circuits. Such a future may even include two or more "uniform" frameworks,
wherein states may attempt to adopt similar laws along circuit "party lines," thus
forcing the Federal Government to attempt to stitch together a national law that
incorporates all sides but misses the mark altogether.
In order for the U.S. to get ahead of this possible issue, either Congress
or the Supreme Court must address the need for a uniform, federal framework
before more states inadvertently contribute to the problem by attempting fix it
themselves.
iv. Many American Businesses Already Comply with the
GDPR
Part II.D explained that the GDPR extends protection to all EU citizens,
thereby imposing an obligation on any company whose business "touches" an
EU citizen, no matter the company's location.
17 1 With the rise of globalization
in recent decades, more and more U.S.-based entities conduct business in foreign
countries on a daily basis.172 In addition, advancements in technology have only
further facilitated the cross-border movement of data between U.S. and foreign
entities.173 As a result, most American entities engaged in transnational data
collection and processing have already been updating their data collection
policies to bring their businesses into compliance with the GDPR and related
international frameworks.174 In fact, some of these entities have gone one step
further-making GDPR-esque data protection and privacy rights available to all
of their customers and contacts. 175
171 Supra Section I.D.
72 See Thomas Hout, Abandoning Globalization Will Only Hurt US. Businesses, HARV. Bus.
REV. (Aug. 20, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/08/abandoning-globalization-will-only-hurt-u-s-
businesses (emphasizing American reliance on foreign markets, especially in the technology
sector); see also Rick Newman, Why US. Companies Aren't So American Anymore, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP. (June 30, 2011, 3:58 PM),
https://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/flowchart/2011/06/30/why-us-companies-arent-so-
american-anymore.
173 See Privacy Shield Program Overview, PRIVACY SHIELD,
https://www.privacyshield.gov/Program-Overview (last visited Mar. 20, 2020).
174 For example, in 2016, American-owned companies, like Twitter, updated their Privacy
Policies to include provisions related to the EU-US Privacy Shield Program. Our Global
Operations and Privacy Shield, TWITTER: PRIVACY POLICY, https://twitter.com/en/privacy (last
visited Sept. 6, 2020). Since the GDPR's entry into force, this and other companies' policies have
been updated to include provisions specific to EU citizens. See, e.g., id.
175 For example, when Barbri, a well-known business providing educational resources for law
students, updated its Privacy Policy and Cookie Policy to reflect the GDPR standards for EU
customers, it took the opportunity to make similar changes to improve the rights of all of its
[Vol. 123288
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Undoubtedly, it is much easier for a business to comply with one or a
few overarching laws or regulations that may be applied to a larger portion of its
clientele than to struggle to keep up with a growing body of law that requires
more or less specific regulation of a smaller audience. In the overarching quest
to simplify all aspects of data privacy, a uniform national framework based on
the principles of the GDPR would not only improve the consumer experience
across data collection and post-breach remedy, but it would also improve
businesses' experiences with compliance by reducing the number of overlapping
and conflicting laws in favor of a streamlined and cohesive collection of rules.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this day and age, consumer data is increasingly valuable, and people
have a right to know just how much their data is worth to the companies charged
with protecting it. But this is not an issue for the states to decide on their own.
Consumers deserve a transparent, unified system that does not make them "wait
until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card fraud in order to give [them]
standing."176 Businesses deserve something better, too: a uniform system of rules
incentivizing respect for consumer rights and protecting company interests. For
the U.S., this translates to the development of a federal framework applicable to
all its citizens and residents and the companies that interact with them. The right
to know, the right to opt-out, and the right to request deletion are fundamental
principles championed by the GDPR, which could positively contribute to the
regulation and protection of consumer data in the U.S. By generating a general
framework of its own, the U.S. could better deter the type of corporate behavior
that tends to result in massive data breaches while allowing consumers to
exercise more control over their data as a way to try and mitigate the number and
consequences of breaches in the future. It is evermore important to recognize
that, at the end of the day, "data subjects" are real human beings whose lives
instantly change after a data breach, and "data collectors and processors" are
groups of human beings who must be held to a higher standard.
Isabella Anderson *
customers. See Cookie Policy, BARBRI (May 25, 2018), https://www.barbri.com/cookie-policy/;
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176 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., L.L.C., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015).
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